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Abstract—the future of the Internet of Things (IoT) involves 
a huge number of node devices such as wireless sensors that 
can communicate in a machine-to-machine pattern, where 
devices will be globally addressed and identified. As the 
number of connected devices increased, the burden on the 
network infrastructure and the size of the routing tables and 
the efficiency of the current routing protocols in the Internet 
backbone increased as well. Recently, an IETF working 
group, along with the research group at Cisco, are working on 
a Locator/ID Separation Protocol as a routing architecture 
that provides new semantics for IP addressing, in order to 
simplify routing operations and improve scalability in the 
future of the Internet such as the IoT. In the light of the 
previous issue; this paperproposesan efficient security 
authentication anda key exchange scheme thatis suited for 
Internet of things based on Locator/ID Separation protocol. 
The proposed protocol method meets practicability, 
simplicity, and strong notions of security. The protocol is 
verified using Automated Validation Internet Security 
Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) which is a push button 
tool for the automated validation of security protocols and the 
achieved results showed that they do not have any security 
flaws.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a tremendous increase in the use of Internet, 
from the 365 million users in 2000 to 1.7 billion users and 
4 billion of mobile users with over 570 million Internet-
enabled handheld devices[1] [2]. That is only the 
beginning, since it is estimated that the extension of the 
Internet to smart things will reach 50 to 100 billion devices 
connected to Internet by the year 2020[3].  
This growth leads to a serious scalability problem as well 
as manageability, addressing/ identity and robustness. In 
addition, the openness and ubiquity features of the current 
Internet present problems in providing suitable solutionsfor 
confidentiality, privacy and security of communications. 
Therefore, new redesign of the Internet architecture and 
adefinition of new protocols are required to solve such 
problems for the Future IoT [4] [5]. For this purpose, 
several projects from industrial and international 
collaboration are being carried out to define the Future of 
the Internet architecture that can solve the limitations of the 
current architecture [6].The Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) is working along with the research group at 
Cisco on the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) [7]. 
Since LISP separates hosts‟ locations and identities; it 
specifies an architecture and mechanism for replacing the 
addresses that are currently being used by IP with two 
separate name spaces: Endpoint IDs (EIDs) used within the 
EID sites and Routing Locators (RLOCs) used on the 
transit networks such as the Internet infrastructure. To 
achieve this separation, LISP defines protocol mechanisms 
for EID to RLOC mapping [8]. Moreover, LISP assumes 
the existence of a mapping system in the form of 
distributed database to store and propagate those mappings 
globally. The functionality of the mapping system can be 
summarised by the following: firstly, the registration stage, 
where the Map Server learns the EIDs-to-RLOC mapping 
from an authoritative LISP-Capable Router and publishes 
them in the database. Secondly, it addresses the resolving 
stage, where the Map Server (MS) accepts Map-Requests 
from routers, looks up the database and returns the 
requested mapping previous researches that have 
concentrated mainly on defining the LISP overall 
architecture as well as the structure of the LISP packets 
such as the Map-Register, Map-Notify and Map-Reply [9].  
 
This paper aims to provide secure communication for 
sensor nodes with a robust authentication key exchange 
establishment technique resilient to some well-known 
attacks such as Man in the middle attack, Secret key 
guessing attack, and replay attack, etc.A formal verification 
method is used to verify the proposed security protocol. 
The analysis and the verification of the designed protocol 
have been implemented via using Automated Validation of 
Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) 
and SPAN.   
The rest of this paper will be sectioned as following: 
Section II presents a background and related work. Section 
III demonstrates the proposed protocol for IP-based 
wireless sensor network using Lisp architecture. Section IV 
analyses the proposed security protocol while section V 
discusses the formal verification and validation of the 
proposed protocol via using AVISPA tool and finally 
section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
A number of cryptographic mechanisms have been 
introduced in the literature for secure authentication and 
encryption in WSNs such as block ciphers as part of 
standards based protocols. Thus, these mechanisms need to 




Figuer et al. [10] proposed a security protocol to access 
web services in 6LoWPAN. The protocol‟s objective is to 
provide a reliable end to end security communication 
for6LoWPAN by using a compression/decompression of 
Internet protocol. Furthermore, the protocol provides 
confidentiality to WSN (6LoWPAN) networks via the use 
of SNOW Stream cipher.  However, this protocol does not 
address a number of attacks. For example, if the adversary 
captures one of the sensor nodes of 6LoWPAN,he can find 
out about the cryptographic data which is stored in the 
sensor node and disclose the network confidentiality. 
Added to this, the attacker can launch DoS and wormhole/ 
sinkhole attacks that make the sensor nodes believe that 
they are neighbor nodes and forward the packets between 
them. This may cause confusion to the getaway in locating 
the node by receiving false data. Another attack may affect 
the network security called the rushing attack which occurs 
through the deployment nodes; this could breakdown the 
communication between the source and the destination by 
transmitting a huge number of packets at the same time. 
 
Zhou et al. [11] proposed an amended security gateway 
protocol based on 6LoWPAN, which connects WSN 
(6LoWPAN) with the IPv6 network. The proposed protocol 
has used an SNEP mechanism to achieve authentication 
and confidentiality through providing a secure guarantee to 
communicate between networks. The main objective of this 
protocol is to provide security between the getaway and the 
node against the malicious nodes or any suspected attacks 
that can compromise the network. However, this protocol 
does not address the resource consumption attacks i.e. 
replayed attacks, DoS and physical node capture attacks. 
E.g. the adversary captures a sensor node (6LoWPAN) via 
using selective forward attacks or even stealing 
cryptographic material which is stored on the node by 
injecting fake packets in the networks. The attacker can 
launch a man in middle attack between the getaway and the 
sensor node and steal/or modify the information between 
them. Also, the Sybil attacks may have a negative impact 
on the network, where malicious nodes can deliver false 
information messages to the getaway. 
 
Kothmayr et al.  [12] hasproposed a security authentication 
protocol for 6LoWPAN based on RSA mechanism which 
uses public key cryptography algorithm. The objective of 
this protocol is to perform authentication in Datagram 
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) between nodes and the 
source publisher via the use of handshake  based on an 
exchange of x.509 certificates containing RSA keys. 
Furthermore, the security protocol provides message 
integrity, confidentiality and authenticity. However, this 
study does not consider the encryption of data between the 
nodes (6LoWPAN). Therefore, a malicious node can spoof 
the original node information that can cause confusion to 
the system by transmitting false data, even though it can 
claim to be an original node to the getaway/or other 
neighboringnodes by using the act technique.Ikram et al. 
[13] proposed a simple authentic bootstrapping protocol for 
IPv6 based on6LoWPAN by using AES encryption which 
is an encryption standard in IEEE 802.15.4. The purpose of 
this protocol is to provide resource efficiency and security 
features assured by secure communications.  Furthermore, 
this protocol  dependson the key management infrastructure 
and it addresses different types of attacks such as, replay 
attack, location privacy attack, passive eavesdropping, DoS 
attack and data loss attack. This study assumed that every 
node (RFDs and FFD) in 6LoWPAN is equipped with 
AES-CMAC-128, AES-CTR and AES- CCM-128. 
However, the adversary can launch an overwhelming 
attack, which can destroy the routing by generating a lot of 
traffic to affect the performance of the getaway. Moreover, 
if the adversary compromises nodes; he can launch a 
combination of wormhole and sinkhole attacks in order to 
manipulate the use of the routing lists that are included in 
the route request query. Adding to this, an adversary can 
manipulate the end-to-end integrity control by modifying a 
number of messages which will have to travel to their 
destination to discover that they have been altered. This 
means that the energy is wasted due to the fact that 
integrity violations are not detected as soon as possible and 
the maliciously modified packet is still forwarded to its 
destination. 
 
Raza et al. [14] proposed a security protocol based on 
CoAP for IoT. This study has provided a solution to reduce 
the overhead of DTLS in 6LoWPAN header compression 
by integrating DTLS and CoAP for IoT. However, the 
provided protocol offers a secure communication (End-to-
End Security) to the 6LoWPAN devices in compression 
with the DTLS. As ,it does not address the authentication 
or encryption scheme,  a malicious node can claim that it is 
an original node and can communicate with the getaway or 
even act as a fake getaway and steal all the information 
nodes. Furthermore, spoofing on the data can occur, since 
there is no encryption that provides confidentiality between 
nodes. Nevertheless, the attacker can track the legitimate 
encrypted packet of the node. It can copy the encrypted 
data from the node and givea false information to the 
getaway which could cause an overloaded network and 
break down the communication link.  
 
Kim.H [15] provided an analysis of security threats to the 
6LoWPAN adaptation layer from the point of view of IP 
packet fragmentation attacks. The proposed work showed 
that IP fragmentation is the attack that can mostly  affect 
the 6LoWPAN. As a result, a  security mechanism against 
the packet fragmentation attacks and replay attacks has 
been proposed. This security mechanism uses Timestamp 
and None Options that are added to the fragmented packets 
at the 6LoWPAN adaptation layer. Nevertheless, the 
mechanism does not address a number of attacks e.g. 
Packet drop attack/or blackhole which can occur when the 
router is compromised due to different causes; one of these 
causes is through the DoS attack because packets are 
routinely dropped from a network. The adversary can 
effectively launch a combined rushing and wormhole attack 
during the neighbour discovery phase and convince the 
remote sensor nodes that he is one of the neighbouring 
nodes and adding him to their list. 
Bonetto et al. [16] investigated the ability to secure the 
communication of smart IoT objects. The objective of 




secure end to end channels between unconstrained and 
remote peers and IoT devices. This study addressed the 
security in terms of resilience against node capture via 
using IPsec security association. However, this is not 
enough to provide a high level of protection to the network. 
The adversary can launch a DoS attack which can affect the 
performance of the network. Also, the attacker can capture 
legitimate nodes by launching the selective forwarding 
attack or by combining the wormhole/ sinkhole/ rushing 
attacks that affect the communication between the nodes 
and the getaway. Shaid et al. [17] suggestedanother 
security protocol based on IPsec to secure the 
communication between sensor nodes in 6LoWPAN and 
the hosts in the IPv6-enabled Internet. The goal of this 
protocol is to provide end to end security via using existing 
methods and infrastructures. Also, it provides 
confidentiality and data integrity between the sensor node 
and the 6LoWPAN router which is connected to the 
Internet source. However, the attacker can sniff the 
legitimate encrypted packet of the node. It can copy the 
encrypted data from the node and give false information to 
the getaway.  
Jung et al. [18] proposed a security protocol for IP-WSN 
(6LoWPAN) via using ECC based on SSL. The objective 
of this protocol is to secure both the sensor and the client 
which is connected to the Internet and that has been 
achieved by using ECC and SSL which is based on the 
handshake protocol. The handshake protocol allows the 
sensor and getaway that are connected to the Internet to be 
authenticated by negotiating cryptographic algorithms and 
keys. The protocol provided authentication and 
confidentiality. Also, there is end to end security between 
the WSN and getaway that are connected to the source 
(internet). However, the adversary can launch Man in 
middle attacks which can be set between the WSN 
(6LoWPAN) and the getaway as a third party and spoof the 
data or even modify and send it to other nodes or getaways.  
Therefore, the need to propose a new authentication 
protocol that can overcome such deficiencies. 
 
 
III.  THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR IP-
BASED WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK 
USING LISP ARCHITECTURE 
This section discusses an authentication and key exchange 
protocol to secure sensor nodes communication based on 
LISP protocol architecture. The protocol uses bit-wise 
exclusive or operation technique.In this protocol, the used 
notations are described   as the following: 
 
Table 1: Protocol Notations 
The Notation Definition 
 
Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
Two communication parties, 
Wireless Sensor Node; its sensor 
device has IP address and prefixes 
identifying the end-points call EID. 
 
XTR 
XTR refers to a device which 
functions both as an Ingress Tunnel 
RouterITR and an Egress Tunnel 





A finite cyclic group 𝒢  generated 
by an element 𝑔 of prime order 𝑝; 
 
𝑵, Z Is an element in 𝒢 
 
𝑷𝑺𝑲𝑨, 𝑷𝑺𝑲𝑩 Public keys of Sensor–A and 
Sensor-B which is shared with  
XTR 
𝑲𝑨, 𝑲𝑩 Private  Keys of Sensors-A and  B 
⊕ Bit-wise exclusive or operation;  
 
𝑯,𝑯′  Two secure on-way hash functions. 
 
SK Session key of (Sensor-A and 
Sensor-B)  
 
In this system it has been assumed that two communication 
parties Sensor-A and Sensor-Bwant to communicate 
together in secure way.  Let 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴be the secret key shared 
between the Sensor-A and XTR which is arbitrary bit 
string. Here Sensor-A stores 𝐾𝐴  , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴  , while the XTR 
stores  𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 , 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴  where 
𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 = 𝑔
𝑘𝐴 and  𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 , 𝐾𝐴 𝐻 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 ,𝐾𝐴 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,  . 
Similarly, 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 can be the secret key shared between 
Sensor-B and XTR. Again, Sensor-B stores 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 , 𝐾𝐵 while 
the XTR stores 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 = 𝑔
𝐾𝐵  and(𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 , 𝐾𝐵)𝐻(𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 , 𝐾𝐵 ,
𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵).  
 
3.1 The Security Protocol   
The following messages show the protocol procedures: 
 
Step1a.  Sensor-A chooses a random number 𝑥 ∈𝑅 𝕫𝑞  and 
computes  𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 𝐻 𝑔
x →
NSensor −Aand sends (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴) to Sensor-B. 
 
Step1b.  Sensor-B chooses a random number 𝑦 ∈𝑅 𝕫𝑞  and 
computes   𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 𝐻 𝑔
y → NSensor −B  




(𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)and (𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵), XTR uses 
𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 and 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 to compute 
 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 𝐻 NSensor −A → 𝑔
x  and 




Step2b. Then XTR chooses a random number 𝑧 ∈𝑅 𝕫𝑞  to 
compute  (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵)
𝑧 , (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧 ,𝑔𝑧 → 𝐿  ,(𝑔𝑥)𝑧 → 𝑔𝑥𝑧 → 𝑎 
, (𝑔𝑦)𝑧 → 𝑔𝑦𝑧 → 𝑏 . Then XTR computes 
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧 ,𝑔𝑥 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑏 →
𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴  and 
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵)
𝑧 , 𝑔𝑦 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵,𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵)𝐻 ⊕ 𝑎 →
𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵  and sends  𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝐿 , (𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝐿)  to Sensor-
B. 
Step3a. OnceSensor-B receives the sent message it uses 
𝐾𝐵  to compute 𝐿𝐾𝐵 → (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵)
𝑧  and 
( 𝑈𝐵)
𝑧 , 𝑔𝑦 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 𝐻 ⊕ 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 →
𝑎  and authenticates XTR. Now, Sensor-B uses 𝑦  to 
compute𝑎𝑦 → 𝑔𝑥𝑦𝑧 → 𝐾 ,  𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 𝐻 → 𝛼and 





Step3b.Sensor-A receives(𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝐿, 𝛼)and it uses𝐾𝐴  to 
compute (𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧 → 𝐿𝐾𝐴  and 
((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧 ,𝑔𝑥 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴)𝐻 ⊕
𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 → 𝑏  and authenticates the XTR router. Then 
Sensor-A uses 𝑥  to compute 𝑏𝑥 → 𝑔𝑥𝑦𝑧 → 𝐾  and checks 
whether (𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)𝐻 → 𝛼  holds or not. If 
it does hold, Sensor-A terminates the protocol, otherwise 
Sensor-A is convinced that 𝐾  is valid session key. After 
that Sensor-A computes  𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 𝐻 → 𝛽 
and forwards it to Sensor-B. Sensor-A computes the 
Session Key 𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 𝐻
′ → 𝑆𝑘𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴. 
 
Step3c. Upon receiving 𝛽 , Sensor-B computes 
 𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 𝐻 → 𝛽  and verifies whether 
computed 𝛽 is equal to the received𝛽. If both are equal then 
B authenticates Sensor-A and computes the session key 




Figure 1: The Proposed Security Protocol for Sensor node communication using LISP network 
 
IV. SECURITY PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
 
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to achieve 
mutual authentication between the sensor nodes and router 
XTR when the nodes are communicating with each other. 
Therefore, this paper presents a simple example for 
authenticating the communicationbetween two nods 
(Sensor-A and Sensor-B) and between the XTR. 
-Trivial attacks:   
Computing the session key from the transmitted messages 
𝛼and𝛽is impossible due to the one-way of hash function 
and, also, for computing it from other transmitted 
messages. The latter can beΖSensor −A  or ΖSensor −B  where an 
attacker has to face the difficulty of a discrete logarithm 
problem. Therefore, this protocol is resistant to trivial 
attack. 
-Secret keys guessing attacks: 
Suppose an attacker or a malicious node Sensor-B tries to 
guess Sensor-A secret key as 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴  generates 
 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 𝐻 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 → 𝑔
𝑥 ′and sends it 
to the XTR router in online Message 1 of the protocol.  To 
verify the correctness of his guessed secret key; it needs to 
compute ((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧 , 𝑔𝑥 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴) 
𝐻 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 →
𝑏and((𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵)
𝑧 ,𝑔𝑦 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵) 
𝐻 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 → 𝑎as it needs the values of 𝐾𝐴  and 𝐾𝐵  for 
computing ( 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧  and ( 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵)
𝑧 . Similarly 
remaining off-line also, using the transferred messages 
𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,𝐿, an attacker cannot verify 
the correctness of its guessed secret key. 
-Man in the middle attack:  
In message 2 of the protocol, XTR authenticates the two 
communicating parties Sensor-A and Sensor-B from the 
message 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 ,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 𝐻 𝑔
𝑥 → 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴  and 
 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 𝐻 𝑔
𝑦 → 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵  sent by 
Sensor-B.  Sensor-A and Sensor-B authenticate XTR, from 
( 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴)
𝑧 ,𝑔𝑥 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜 𝑟−𝐴 ,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 𝐻 𝑏 →
𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴  and 
( 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵)




𝑍𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵  as 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 ,𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵  are known only to XTR. Finally, 
Sensor-A authenticates Sensor-B 
from 𝐾, 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 𝐻 → 𝛼. Thus, in each message 
of the protocol, each party authenticates the other 
communicating party and hence there is no scope for man 
in the middle attack.  
-Forgery attacks: 
In this case the XTR is compromised, the attacker is 
required to compute 
 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 𝐻 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 → 𝑔
𝑥  and 
 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 , 𝑖𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 , 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 𝐻 𝑁𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 → 𝑔
𝑦  where 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 
and 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵  are secret keys of Sensor-A and Sensor-B 
respectively. However it is not possible to compute these 
values without the knowledge of the secret keys and hence 
Sensor-A and Sensor-B cannot construct the common 
session key. 
-Replay attack: 
Since one wayhash function is used, this protocol is 
invulnerable to this attack. 
-Perfect forward secrecy: 
When the secret keys of 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 and 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 of Sensor-A and 
Sensor-Bdeceives are compromised, the attacker cannot 
calculate the session key as 𝐾𝐴  and 𝐾𝐵 are known. These 
values remain unknown even to the XTR router so there is 
no chance of any compromise. Also, the session key is 
independent on any session and  𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧  are randomly 
chosen.  
The security-related goals could be achieved using different 
protocols, examples of that; there are the Internet key 
Exchange (IEK) and the virtual Private Network (VPN) 
protocols such as the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec). 
However, these protocols will increase the number of 
exchanged messages significantly, at least five extra 
messages in the case of IKE and more than this, in the case 
of IPSec (based on the IPSec mode). Furthermore, packets 
encapsulation due the tunneling process in VPN protocols 
will lead to adding extra load to the header of Sensor 
communication packets which make them incompatible 
with the current implementation Sensor communication 
capable devices. 
 
V. FORMAL VERIFICATION AND 




AVISPA is a push tool for the automated validation of 
security protocols. A modular and expressive formal 
language called High level protocols specification language 
(HLPSL) is used by AVISPA to specify the security 
protocol and their properties. HLPSL is a role-based 
language, meaning that we first specify the sequence of 
actions of each kind of protocol participant in a module, 
which is called a basic role. This specification can later be 
instantiated by one or more agents playing the given role. 
Later on, this paper will specify how the resulting 
participants interact with one another by combining 
multiple basic roles together into a composed role. HLPSL 
specification is translated into the Intermediate Format (IF), 
using hlpsl2if. The IF specification is then processed by 
model-checkers to analyze if the security goals are violated. 
There are four different verification back end tools use to 
analyze the IF specification namely; OFMC (on-the-Fly 
Model-Checker), CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based Attack 
Searcher), SATMC (SAT-based Model-Checker), TA4SP 
(Tree Automata-based Protocol Analyzer). Possible flaws 
in a protocol can be identified using these back end tools. 
As, exponential and XOR operations are supported by CL-
AtSe and OFMC back ends,  OFMC back end tool will be 
used with AVISPA and SPAN (Animation tool for 
AVISPA) to analyze the proposed protocols.  
 
5.2. Specification and Verification of protocol   
 
As mentioned earlier, the proposed protocol has been 
implemented and evaluated using AVISPA protocol 
analysis tool. The achieved result has shown that no attack 
is being found. For this protocol, three basic roles played 
by Sensor (A), Sensor (B) and XTR (R) router have been 
defined. 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐴 and 𝑃𝑆𝐾𝐵 are shared with XTR and hence 
represent the symmetric keys . 𝐾𝐴and𝐾𝐵  remain secret with 
Sensor-A and Sensor-B as their private keys. XTR router 
gets 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴 = exp⁡(𝐺,𝐾1) from Sensor-A and 𝑈𝐵 =
exp⁡(𝐺, 𝐾2) from Sensor-B. Hence 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐴  and 𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟 −𝐵 
are the public keys whose inverse is known only to Sensor-
A and Sensor-B respectively. After defining the #basic 
roles, it is essentially needed to define the composed roles 
which describe the sessions of the protocol. The 
#composed roles have no transition section, but rather a 
composition section in which the basic roles are 
instantiated.  
The /\ operator indicates that these roles should execute in 
parallel. In the session role,it usually declares all the 
channels used by the basic roles. These variables are not 
instantiated with concrete constants. The channel type 
takes an additional attribute, in parentheses, which specifies 
the intruder model that assumed for that channel. Here, the 
type of the declaration channel (dy) stands for the Dolev-
Yao intruder model. Under this model, the intruder has full 
control over the network, i.e. all messages, sent by agents, 
will go to the intruder. He may intercept, analyze and /or 
modify message (as far as he knows the required keys), and 
send any message he composes to whoever he pleases, 
posing as any other agents. Finally, a top-level role is 
always defined. This role contains global constants and a 
composition of one or more sessions, where the #intruder 
may play some roles as a legitimate user. There is also a 
statement which describes what knowledge the intruder 
initially has. Typically, this includes the names of all 
agents, all the symmetric keys and any shares with 
others.Note that the constant ‘I’is used to refer to the 
intruder as the source code shows in the appendix. 
#Specifying Security Goals are specified in HLPSL by 
augmenting the transitions of the basic roles with the so-
called goal facts and by then assigning them a meaning by 
describing, in the HLPSL goal   section, what conditions –
i.e. what combination of such facts  indicate an attack and a 
violation of secrecy. The goal declaration section describes 
that it should be considered as an attack when the intruder 




specified in terms of temporal logic but useful and concise 
macros are provided for two most frequently used security 
goals, authentication and secrecy. 
 
Table 1 shows the results of security protocol authentication for 
sensor nodes communication based on LISP network.  
Table 1: AVISPA Tools (OFMC, ATSE, SATMC, and TA4SP) 
Results 
Version Tool Description Result 
Basic session OFMC VisitedNodes:23453 nodes 
Depth: 6 plies 
Search Time: 0.8s 
SAFE 
Basic session ATSE Analysed:      3874 States 
Reachable:     2635 States 
Translation:   0.00 seconds 
Computation: 0.06 seconds 
SAFE & 
goal as specified 
 
 
Basic session SATMC STATISTICS 
Attack Found : false   Boolean 
Upper Bound Reached: true Boolean 
Graph Leveled off: 5 steps 
Sat Solver: zchaff Solver 
Max Steps Number: 11 Steps 
Steps Number : 5 Steps 
Atoms Number: 543 Atoms 
Clauses Number 1613 Clauses 
Encoding Time: 0.2 Seconds 
If2Sate Compilation Time 0.06 Seconds 
ATTACK TRACE 
%%no attacks have been found… 
SAFE 
Basic session TA4SP STALISTICS 
SECURITY-As specified 
ATTACK TRACE 




With the increasing need for authentication and secure 
communication, this paper has proposed a security protocol 
for ip-based sensor network using LISP architecture. The 
achieved results showed that the proposed scheme is more 
secure and efficient than the existing protocols .Moreover; 
it can resist all the well-known attacks. The formal 
verification of the proposed protocol via using AVISPA 
tool showed that there are no attacks against any of the 
checked assertions that the protocol successfully achieved 
through a number of crucial security requirements. 
Examples of such requirements arethe mutual 
authenticating, the participating parties and maintaining the 
security of the session key between Sensor A and Sensor B. 
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